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This work presents a comprehensive survey on evolutionary economics intending at exploring the 
main research paths and contributions of this theorizing framework using bibliometric methods. 
This documentation effort is based on an extensive review of the abstracts from articles published in 
all economic journals gathered from the Econlit database over the past fifty years.  
Evolutionary contributions apparently have not converged to an integrated approach. In the present 
paper, we document the more important paths emergent in this field. Our results show two rather 
extreme main research strands: ‘History of Economic Thought and Methodology’ (29.0%) and 
‘Games’ (18.4%). ‘Development, Environment and Policy’ (14.2%) emerges as the third most 
frequent category. It is important to highlight moreover that before 1990, the importance of 
published evolutionary related research is almost negligible. More than 90% of total papers were 
published after that date.  
An important point in the analysis is developed around the choices that have been made by 
evolutionist researchers in terms of formalism versus empiricism. The general perception within 
evolutionary (and non-evolutionary) researchers is that in this field formalization lags behind the 
conceptual work. However, as we show in the present paper, formal approaches have a reasonable 
and increasing share of published papers between 1969 and 2005 (around one-third). In contrast, 
purely empirical-related works are relatively scarce, involving a meagre and stagnant percentage 
(7%) of published works for the period 1992 up to 2005.  




  11. Introduction  
Evolutionary economics appears as a theoretical hybrid of evolutionary theory, complex systems 
theory, self-organization theory and agent-based computational theory. At the same time, it is 
characterized by a methodological combination of Austrian, Behavioural, Institutional, Post-
Keynesian and Schumpeterian economics (Dopfer and Potts, 2004). This combination of theories 
and methods has the advantage of contributing to novelty in scientific knowledge. However, it 
generates a widespread and somewhat nebulous scope, being extremely difficult to promote further 
deep theoretical developments and to coordinate individual empirical studies (Dopfer and Potts, 
2004). Whilst in neoclassical economics there is a strong commitment around a common research 
core, evolutionary economics lacks a clear analytical framework. As Dopfer and Potts (2004) stress, 
evolutionary economics needs to do a deep analysis concerning the reality of the subject matter, that 
is, its ontological foundations. 
Investigating the state of the art in evolutionary economics reveals that many distinct and 
controversial ideas are still present about the choice of an appropriate ontology for evolutionary 
economics. On this subject, Hogdson (1999) recalls the opposition between the ‘organicist’ 
ontology and the ‘atomist’ ontology. The first category encompasses the essential characteristics of 
an element as the outcome of relations with other elements. Therefore, in social sciences, the 
individual is understood as being moulded by relations with other individuals (Winslow, 1989). In 
contrast, the atomist ontology (common to the Greek atomists’ thought and to the Newtonian 
physics) sees entities’ characteristics as independent from the relations with other entities. In 
neoclassical economics, the individual is taken as given. In evolutionary economics, the atomist 
ontology is rejected, and a debate is going on about the legitimacy of borrowing from evolutionary 
biology (Lawson, 2003).  
There are different proposals concerning what should be an appropriate ontology for evolutionary 
economics, with some assuming that certain ideas, insights and theoretical principles born in 
evolutionary biology can be organized to study economic evolutionary processes, and others openly 
denying this possibility. As Vromen (2004) states, not only authors suggest different (own 
favourite) ontological views, they also disagree about what ontology is all about. By establishing 
differences and common grounds between distinct approaches to the definition of an ontology for 
evolutionary economics (e.g. Lawson, 2003; Dopfer and Potts, 2004; Knudsen, 2004; Witt, 2004), 
  2Vromen arrives at three clusters of controversial issues in this field: the Universal Darwinism 
approach, the Continuity Hypothesis and the proposition of a Layered Ontology.
1  
A second question focused in the debate concerning the analytical coherence of evolutionary 
economics is methodological. The field is featured by a great variety in tools and methods, many of 
them not originated within economics or social sciences. Examples are thermodynamics, biology, 
systems theory, complexity theory, cognitive science, computer science and neuroscience (Dopfer 
and Potts, 2004). There are no clear principles that allow establishing some unifying directions. 
These difficulties are not surprising since the subject domain in focus is a high-dimensional, non-
linear dynamic process of emergent complexity, open system (e.g. Foster, 2003; Lawson, 2003).  
In mainstream economics, reductionism appears as the main method of aggregation chosen to build 
up the theory.
2 In social sciences reductionism prevails in the form of methodological 
individualism, that is, all explanations of social structures and institutions must be completely 
embedded in individuals. This reductionist perspective emerged in economics since the 1960s, with 
the attempt to found macroeconomics on ‘sound microeconomics’. Opposing to reductionism is the 
existence of complex systems with different levels that cannot be totally explained in terms of 
another level (Hodgson, 1999). By studying ongoing economic evolutionary processes, which are 
ongoing cumulative historical processes, featured by higher order complexity, evolutionary 
economics cannot accept a reductionist methodology. Instead, it invokes a non-reductionist 
approach or co-evolution across levels of analysis (Dosi and Winter, 2000). Each level in the 
complex, evolving, economic realm interacts with the others.  
In terms of the representation of micro economic agents, neoclassical economics chooses 
‘typological thinking’ since all individuals and firms are studied by analysing the behaviour of a 
‘representative agent’, typically described by a perfect rational maximizer of utility (Castellacci, 
2004). In turn, evolutionary economics usually adopts ‘population thinking’, meaning that the 
economic theory must be built on the heterogeneity that features the population of economic agents 
(e.g. Hodgson, 1993; Andersen, 1994). 
                                                           
1 Universal Darwinism considers that ongoing processes of economic evolution show the same fundamental 
characteristics as Darwinian evolutionary processes in biology. The Continuity Hypothesis embraces the idea that non-
economic evolutionary processes, prior to ongoing economic evolutionary processes, made these last ones possible. 
Moreover, the prior evolutionary processes that made ongoing economic evolutionary processes possible may still 
influence the latter. At last, the Layered Ontology perspective recognizes the existence of several related levels of 
organization in the economic realm, understood at lowers levels of organization. These are studied by other scientific 
disciplines such as psychology, biology and physics, where ongoing evolutionary processes exist (Vromen, 2004). 
2 A detailed discussion concerning the importance of the different aggregation levels used in economic theory appears 
in Hodgson (1993, Ch. 15). The three major strategies registered in the history of economic thought is methodological 
individualism, methodological holism and non-reductionism. 
  3Another issue sturdily marked by methodological considerations consists in the use of mathematical 
models in economics. For the mainstream, almost all reasoning has been putted forth in 
mathematical terms, with strong and clear advantages in the establishment of the logical coherence 
of theoretical arguments. However, outside the orthodox view, for example, in evolutionary 
theorizing, mathematical precision is not a fundamental characteristic, even when models are used 
(Backhouse, 2000).  
Neoclassical economics depicts the economic world following a mechanistic perspective, inspired 
in physics, which implies determinism and predictability. In fact, this view considers that, given the 
initial conditions at the present time and the economic system’s law of motion, any state in the 
future can be perfectly predicted (Castellacci, 2004). In this conceptualisation, formalism is 
achieved with mathematical tools available for dealing with deterministic, closed-systems, where all 
relevant variables and relationships between them are predictable, consenting for representation in a 
formal mathematical model (Dow, 2000). 
However, as Hodgson (1993) stresses, the economic world is characterized by uncertainty and 
unpredictability, which are introduced by purposeful behaviour and the creativity of agents. This 
non-mechanistic, non-deterministic and unpredictable perspective of the economic process is 
adopted by evolutionary theorizing, meaning much more complexity in economic analyses and 
more difficulty to formalize theoretical reasonings.  Moreover, while for the economic mainstream 
the process of economic growth converges to a final state of equilibrium, outside mainstream the 
economy is conceived as a never ending and ever changing process, and does not converge to a 
steady state of balanced growth (e.g. Metcalfe et al., 2000). The economic analysis based on an 
open-system approach (non-deterministic) where not all relevant variables and relationships are 
knowable, allows the emergence of a range of possible combinations of methods (Dow, 2000). 
For some authors, for example Romer (1993), the wide dispersion that characterizes heterodox 
theoretical approaches is mainly determined by the absence of a mathematical, formal modelling 
framework similar to the one adopted by neoclassical economics, which is considered as 
fundamental for establishing a logical coherence in the theoretical reasoning. Moreover, Romer 
expects that if the heterodox approaches continue to reject formalism they will gradually disappear. 
However, as document in Section 3, evolutionary economics has become increasingly formal. 
Notwithstanding, such trend has been featured by the emergence of divergent ontological and 
methodological research paths. As above mentioned, evolutionary economics has a wide range of 
research areas such as technical advance and economic growth, industrial organization, game 
theory, learning dynamics and bounded rationality structure, organization theory, financial markets 
  4and the interactions between economics, law and culture (Silverberg and Verspagen, 1997). In spite 
of that large spectrum of approaches and of ongoing debates around ontological and methodological 
issues, there are important common elements in this approach. The economy is conceived as a 
complex and evolving system, characterized by changing diversity and evolving processes of 
adaptive behaviour, where novelty has a fundamental role (Andersen, 1994). Agents are bounded 
rational and heterogeneous; there are open-ended search spaces and novelty is endogenous; the 
economy is by definition ‘out-of-equilibrium’ at any time (for example, Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Dosi, 1988a, 1988b; Nelson, 1995; Nelson and Winter, 2002). Theoretical evolutionary economic 
reasonings typically involve random and mechanic elements, with the first ones generating some 
variation among the variables in study and the second ones winning systematically on existing 
variation. There are inertial forces that guarantee the survival of the winnowing (Silverberg and 
Verspagen, 1997). 
From this theoretical debate, it seems apparent that evolutionary contributions have not converged 
to an integrated approach. This debate however, lacks of empirical evidence. Thus, the present 
paper illustrates the more important paths emergent in this field from 1960s onwards. This 
documentation effort is based on a review of the abstracts from articles published in all economic 
journals gathered from the Econlit database over the past fifty years.
3  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section details the methodology underlying the study. 
After an overview of the history of evolutionary theory in economics in Section 3, Section 4 argues 
that evolutionary researchers have been ‘obsessed’ with modelling issues, whereas evidence shows 
that the real lacuna relies on the scarcity of empirical related studies. Section 5 further details the 
documentation exercise, offering evidence regarding the ‘quality’ of research within evolutionary 
field. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
2. Bibliometric exercise on evolutionary research: methodological considerations 
An inquiry on evolutionary thinking in economics makes immediately clear the widely and 
somewhat confusing variety of perspectives that are identified as ‘evolutionary’. Hodgson (1999) 
pointed out the existence of ‘at least’ six main groups using this term:  
- Institutionalists in the tradition of Veblen and John Commons depict their approach as 
‘evolutionary economics’ and generally consider as virtual synonyms the terms ‘evolutionary’ 
                                                           
3 EconLit is the American Economic Association's electronic bibliography of economics literature throughout the world. 
It is considered a fundamental research tool in economics, providing different types of information, from bibliographic 
citations, with selected abstracts, to international literature on economics since 1969. It covers a broad range of 
document types published worldwide, namely journal articles. 
  5and ‘institutional’; they mainly operate under the USA-based and Institutionalist Association for 
Evolutionary Economics; 
- Schumpeter’s followers also describe their work as ‘evolutionary economics’ as can be clearly 
checked looking at the title of the journal published by the International Joseph Schumpeter 
Association, Journal of Evolutionary Economics; 
- The Austrian School of economists is frequently pictured as ‘evolutionary’, pervasively influenced 
by the works of Menger
4 and Hayek
5; 
- The work of various writers such as Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Alfred Marshall is occasionally 
mentioned as ‘evolutionary’ in its nature; 
- An important recent development in mathematical economics, the evolutionary game theory; 
- The work developed by the Santa Fe Institute in the United States, which entails applications of 
chaos theory and several other types of computer simulation, is sometimes associated to the term 
‘evolutionary’.  
The use of the word ‘evolutionary’ in economics is so wide that Hodgson understands this as “a 
matter of fashion” (Hodgson, 1999: 128). This astonishing amplitude of the subject means 
important difficulties in the analysis of its recent consolidation. After all, the debate on what is 
‘evolutionary economics’ still goes on since the notion of evolution appears as a central concept in 
several analytical perspectives, even if with distinct interpretations and uses (Dosi and Winter, 
2000).  
Dosi et al. (2002) also emphasize the above-mentioned amplitude, calling attention to the 
overlapping between ‘evolutionary’ and some ‘socio-economic’ analyses of the “fabrics and 
changes of both technological knowledge and economic structures. [T]hey all share 
microfoundations grounded on heterogeneous agents, multiple manifestations of ‘bounded 
rationality’, diverse learning patterns and diverse behavioral regularities” (Dosi et al., 2002: 3). 
Nelson (1995) selects four main themes within evolutionary economics: theories concerned with a 
particular phenomenon associated with long run economic change such as science, technology, 
business organization and law; models of economic growth driven by technical advance; co-
evolution of technology and industry structure; and organizations and structures. 
                                                           
4 Menger’s  theory of the evolution of money and other institutions is the standard example (Hodgson, 1999). 
5 Hayek has made extensive use of an evolutionary analogy imported from biology, related to the concept of 
spontaneous order (Hodgson, 1999). 
  6Putting aside the issue of the wide use of the term evolutionary, we propose the following 
categorization for our bibliometric analysis: 1) Behaviour (firms, consumers), organizations; 2) 
Technology, industry, trade; 3) Technological change, economic growth, business cycles; 4) 
Institutions, markets; 5) Development, environment, cultural change, human behaviour, policy; 6) 
Games; 7) History of economic thought and methodology; 8) Regional economics, space analysis. 
Our bibliometric analysis tries to capture the recent paths that evolutionary economics has been 
reinforcing. More than twenty years after the seminal contribution of Nelson and Winter (1982), it 
is important to develop such an assessment. The documentation is based on a review of the abstracts 
from articles published in all economic journals gathered from the Econlit database, which covers, 
among others, the core journals in the subject such as Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Research 
Policy and Industrial and Corporate Change, over the past fifty years (1960s-2000s).  
The database was obtained using as keyword for search the term ‘evolutionary’. The total number 
of analysed records was 2510 though the articles that corresponded to comments, rejoinders, 
corrigendas were disqualified from the categorization. Also, some records do not show an abstract 
and so were also excluded (but included in the temporal analysis). At the end we remained with 
1952 records (2377 with and without abstracts). The publication activity in evolutionary economics 
during the chosen period is analysed in terms of the eight main themes, identified above.  
Within evolutionary economics we can identify two important methodologies, which were proposed 
by Nelson and Winter (1982): ‘formal theorizing’ and ‘appreciative theorizing’. The first level takes 
place when the economist develops a reasoning putting forth, in a conscious manner, a theoretical 
argument. The second level has to do with explanations about certain phenomena not identified as a 
‘theory’. In these accounts complex causal arguments are frequently present even if they appear in 
the form of stories. Therefore, the authors consider a mistake to see the differences between this last 
level of abstraction and the equilibrium theory developments as a distinction between description 
and theory. Instead, they correspond to two different kinds of theories because the causal 
mechanisms and relationships are different (Nelson, 1995). 
In order to identify the main method of research, and following Nelson and Winter’s (1982) original 
proposal, we categorise the articles into six classes: 1) formal; 2) appreciative; 3) formal and 
empirical; 4) appreciative and empirical; 5) empirical; and 6) surveys.  
In the following section, we overview the literature on evolutionary research, providing a more 
quantitative analysis by applying this bibliometric methodology. Such documentation effort is 
likely to constitute a step forward towards a more rigorous account of the evolutionary research 
paths in the past fifty years.  
  73. Evolutionary Theory in Economics: an overview 
3.1 From the ‘old evolutionary economics’ to the 1980s: Biological metaphors in economics
6
The relationship between biology and economics is remote and has worked in both directions (see, 
for example, Hodgson, 1999). Thomas Malthus and Adam Smith, with their ideas of competition 
and struggle, inspired both economics and biology. Hodgson uses the concept of ‘metaphor’ to 
analyse the evolution of economics as a science, sustaining the idea that biological metaphors have 
been present in economics for a long time, while showing very different degrees of popularity 
(Hodgson, 1999).  
The emergence of neoclassical economics in the 1870s was intrinsically associated with physics, 
not biology (Mirowski, 1989; Ingrao and Israel, 1990). Meanwhile, biology had a strong presence 
in the social sciences in the 1880s and 1890s.
7 Many authors recall Alfred Marshall’s view that ‘the 
Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology’ (Marshall, 1948: xiv). The heterodox Thorstein 
Veblen clearly embraced biology, asking ‘Why is economics not an evolutionary science?’.
8 
Therefore, during the period 1890-1914 the biological metaphor was present in economics as the 
discourses of authors like Marshall, Veblen, Spencer, Schumpeter, Menger, Hayek and others are 
testimony (Hodgson, 1999). All of them saw their work as first steps towards a broad understanding 
of the evolution of economic life. Smith emphasized the interplay between division of labour, 
dynamic economies of scale and capital’s accumulation; Menger was focused in subjects like the 
changing quality and diversity of economic goods and the emergence of money through a process 
of trial-and-error; Marshall focused the existence of internal and external economies for the 
‘representative firm’ and made an analysis of the rise and fall of firms with distinct endowments in 
their competitive struggle; Schumpeter
9 conceived capitalism as a process of creative destruction. 
However, all these contributions did not conduct to the emergence of an integrated approach. 
                                                           
6 Hodgson (1993) offers an excellent history of evolutionary theorizing in economics. 
7 By the end of the Victorian era social scientists generally accepted the idea of a ‘biological root to human nature’ 
(Hodgson, 1999: 89). However, in the beginning of the twentieth century they started rejecting explanations based on 
biological concepts like human attributes and behaviour.  
8 Veblen published in 1898 his famous article ‘Why is economics not an evolutionary science?’ in the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, proposing a reconstruction of economics based on Darwinian methods and metaphors instead the 
dominant mechanist ones. He recalled that the Darwinian natural selection is characterized by three principles: i) 
existence of sustained variation among the elements of a population; ii) presence of a principle of heredity or continuity 
which enables that individual characteristics are passed on from on generation to another; iii) natural selection’s 
functioning occurs because the variations (or gene combinations) preserved are those with better advantages in the 
struggle for survive. However, Veblen did not accept that the human behaviour was just the result of genetic 
inheritance, adopting an interactionist and anti-reductionist approach, with “both the agent and his environment being at 
any point the outcome of the last process” (Veblen, 1898: 391). 
9 Although the evolutionists Nelson and Winter (1982) identify the foundations of their work largely in Schumpeter, 
Schumpeter himself has a somehow inconsistent role in the history of economic thought (Andersen, 1994). On one 
hand, economic evolution has a crucial place in his analytic work; on the other hand, he appears significantly connected 
with the marginalist revolution. “Throughout his intellectual career he was tormented by the conflict between his 
evolutionary pivot and his emphasis on conceptual clarity and mathematical tools of analysis” (Andersen 1994: 12). 
  8Andersen (1994) mentions the contribution of the marginalist revolution, the Keynesian revolution 
and the post-war formalist revolution to the disappearance of those remote evolutionary 
perspectives. Nelson and Winter (2002) identifies as the central factor responsible for the vanish of 
many evolutionary analogies in the early post war period the increasing focus of neoclassical 
economic theory on equilibrium conditions.  
This historical outcome did not emerge only from external factors as the dominance of the 
neoclassical paradigm (Andersen, 1997). Indeed, there are fundamental intrinsic difficulties also 
responsible for it such as the fact that the product of evolutionary processes has very little 
predictability, which may block the falsification of evolutionary theorizing; the impression of 
eclecticism imposed by the “synthetic character of the evolutionary mechanism which forces 
evolutionary-economic theories to transgress the borders of different social-sciences disciplines” 
(Andersen, 1997: 2). But, according to Andersen, the most important reason for the failure of the 
old evolutionary perspectives in economics corresponds to what he calls a ‘tool problem’: those old 
visions could not be supported by adequate analytic tools. 
Evolutionary ideas remained in the shadow
10 until the publication of Armen Alchian’s article in 
1950.
11 Alchian (1950) argued that the assumption of maximizing behaviour by the firm was 
refutable. He proposed the existence of selection processes ensuring the survival of the more 
profitable firms, even if firms do not attempt to maximize profits. Friedman (1953) modified 
Alchian’s ideas arguing that natural selection was a foundation for assuming that agents act ‘as if’ 
they maximize, independently of what is their effective behaviour. For Friedman, the evolutionary 
processes conduct to an evolutionary optimum. Penrose (1952) treated some crucial issues about the 
relationship between economics and biology, which are still in agenda. She advised caution in what 
concerns the use of biological metaphors, criticising Alchian and others of ignoring a fundamental 
characteristic of human activity in the economic world: the deliberative and calculative behaviour. 
Hodgson (1999) identifies other contributions that marked in a certain sense a return to biologic 
analogies in economics dating back Hayek (1967) and Becker (1976). The first invoked some 
evolutionary references. The second presented a model within a neoclassical format but suggesting 
genetic determinism in human behaviour.  
                                                           
10 To justify this obscurantism Hodgson points to internal problems in biology such as Darwin’s failure in explaining 
the heredity’s mechanisms and the source of organisms’ variation (a gap only eliminated after the neo-Darwinian 
synthesis of Mendelian genetics after 1940). But he also identifies the role of some ideological perspectives with racist 
and sexist conclusions, abusively drawn from a “biologically-grounded social science” (Hodgson, 1999: 100). At the 
same time positivism was becoming stronger. By the 1920s, logical positivism appeared as the prevailing conception of 
science (Hodgson, 1999). 
11 By this time a new Darwinian biology had emerged (during the 1940s) as the outcome of a synthesis between the 
theory of natural selection and Mendelian genetics. Also, Crick and Watson discovered the structure of DNA in 1953 
(Hodgson, 1999). 
  9Two decades after Alchian, Nelson and Winter (1973, 1974, 1975) marked the resurgence of 
evolutionary thought in economics (see Table 1). These authors represent a crucial mark in the re-
emergence of biological metaphors in economics and, more generally, in social sciences. They have 
a quite different approach from the one adopted by authors as Becker. In fact, while Becker’s view 
was reductionist, Nelson and Winter reject the notion that genes are the principal or the only 
determinant of human behaviour. They adopt an interactionist perspective, conceiving different 
levels and units of selection and continuous interaction between the individuals, the institutions and 
their socio-economic environment (Hodgson, 1999). 
Table 1: Evolutionary-related research articles published in 1970s 
Authors (year)  Title  Journal 
Cornehls (1969)           On the Use and Misuse of Veblen's 'Evolutionary 
Economics.'                                           Oxford Economic Papers                
Oser (1970)              Some Evolutionary Developments in International Trade and 
Finance                                              Journal of Economic Issues              
Barker (1971)             The Evolutionary Nature of the New Rice Technology         Food Research Institute Studies           
Urban (1971)             Evolutionary Model Building                             Journal of Marketing Research           
Litschert (1972)           Formal Long-Range Planning Groups: Their Evolutionary 
Nature                                               Journal of Economics and Business        
Nelson and Winter 
(1973)                
Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Economic 
Capabilities                                          American Economic Review            
Hamilton (1973)           What Has Evolutionary Economics to Contribute to 
Consumption Theory?                                   Journal of Economic Issues              
Nelson and Winter 
(1974)                 
Neoclassical vs. Evolutionary Theories of Economic 
Growth: Critique and Prospectus                        Economic Journal                    
Isard (1975)  Notes on an Evolutionary Theoretic Approach to World 
Organization                                         
Peace Science Society (International) 
Papers                              
Roberts (1975)            An Evolutionary and Institutional View of the Behavior of 
Public and Private Companies                             American Economic Review             
Nelson and Winter 
(1975)               
Growth Theory from an Evolutionary Perspective: The 
Differential Productivity Puzzle                          American Economic Review            
Source: Econlit database. 
It is interesting to note that from the few (11) articles indexed in Econlit relative to the 1970s, three 
are authored by Nelson and Winter. They constitute the fundaments of their 1982’s book, An 
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change. 
2.2 The 1980s: Nelson and Winter’s seminal contribution 
Creative intelligence, in the realm of technology as elsewhere, is autonomous and erratic, compulsive 
and whimsical. It does not lie placidly within the prescriptive and descriptive constraints imposed by 
outsiders to the creative process, be they theorists, planners, teachers, or critics. To progress with the 
task of understanding where creative thought is likely to lead the world, it is therefore helpful to 
recognize first of all that the task can never be completed. Our evolutionary theory of economic 
change is in this spirit; it is not an interpretation of economic reality as a reflection of supposedly 
constant “given data”, but a scheme that may help an observer who is sufficiently knowledgeable 
regarding the facts of the present to see a little further through the mist that obscures the future 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982: viii) 
  10Nelson and Winter (1982) deeply discuss the limitations of neoclassical economics that they 
identify at theoretical, empirical and practical levels. They focus that the orthodox approach
12 is still 
relying on equilibrium analysis, even when assuming more flexible forms. Hence, it leaves many 
phenomena associated with historical change completely unknown. In addition, they stress that the 
orthodox assumption of economic rational actors (meaning that they optimise) has not been 
significantly loosen up in neoclassical advanced theorizing. Therefore, Nelson and Winter conclude 
about the “inability of the prevailing theory to come to grips with uncertainty, or bounded 
rationality, or the presence of large corporations, or institutional complexity, or the dynamics of 
actual adjustment processes” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 5). 
Nelson and Winter propose the development of an evolutionary theory of the capabilities and 
behaviour of business firms operating in a certain market environment. In this sense, they strongly 
represent the return of biological metaphors to economics. In this theoretical frame, firms are 
motivated by profit and develop search actions trying to improve profits. However, those actions 
are not assumed to be profit maximizing over given choice sets, well defined and exogenous. There 
is a selection process operating on the firm’s internal routines
13 and the routines are understood as 
the appropriated and effective behaviours in a certain setting. They are the outcome of processes 
characterized by profit-oriented, learning and selection (Nelson, 1995). “Metaphorically, the 
routines employed by a firm at any time can be regarded as the best it ‘knows and can do’. To 
employ them is rational in that sense, even though the firm did not go through any attempt to 
compare its prevailing routines with all possible alternative ones” (Nelson, 1995: 69). 
In evolutionary models usually there are three distinct kinds of routines (Nelson, 1995). The first 
corresponds to the ‘standard operating procedures’ that establishes firm’s production, in terms of 
how and how much, under different circumstances, considering as given the capital stock and other 
constraints fixed in the short run. Technologies belong to this classification. The routines that 
determine firm’s investment behaviour belong to the second kind, usually treated as the equations 
that establish investment variation as a function of firm’s profits (and, eventually, other variables). 
The third kind of routines corresponds to the deliberative processes of the firm, that is, all the 
routines that mean searching for “better ways of doing things” (Nelson, 1995: 69). These routines 
“play the role that genes play in biological evolutionary theory” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 14) 
Nelson and Winter identify functional characteristics with routines. They see routines as 
                                                           
12 They identify orthodoxy as “the modern formalization and interpretation of the broader tradition of Western 
economic thought whose line of intellectual descent can be traced from Smith and Ricardo through Mill, Marshall, and 
Walras” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 6). 
13 “We use ‘routine’ in a highly flexible way, much as ‘program’ is used in discussion of computer programming. It 
may refer to a repetitive pattern of activity in an entire organization, to an individual skill, or, as an adjective, to the 
smooth uneventful effectiveness of such an organizational or individual performance” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 97).  
  11repositories of knowledge and skills, having the capacity of replicate (for example, through 
imitation and personal mobility). It is precisely because they have a replication capacity and are 
relatively durable that routines are the analogy of the gene in biology, transmitting and conserving 
information through time (Hodgson, 1999). 
Recognizing the possibility of innovative activity and the ‘nonroutine’ nature of much of the 
business behaviour, Nelson and Winter pointed to “the existence of stochastic elements both in the 
determination of decisions and of decisions outcomes” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 15). 
To encompass changes in the routines, Nelson and Winter borrow the concept of search from 
biology: “Our concept of ‘search’ obviously is the counterpart of that of mutation in biological 
evolutionary theory” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 18). In Chapter 9 of their book they present an 
evolutionary model of economic growth where they illustrate this concept. In the model it is 
assumed the existence of a threshold level of profitability. When firms are profitable enough they 
try to keep their routines and do not enter into search.
14 If profitability falls bellow the level 
assumed, firms are induced to consider alternatives. As Nelson and Winter construct search in their 
models as R&D actions, in case of adversity, firms will invest in R&D and engage actions to 
discover new techniques having the restore of profitability as goal. In this setting, firms’ R&D 
activity “should thus be conceived as representing an ad hoc organizational response rather than a 
continuing policy commitment. This satisfying assumption is a simple and extreme representation 
of the incentives affecting technical change at the firm level” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 211). In 
different modelling settings, the authors consider that firms have a policy R&D commitment.  
Another analogy brought from biology by Nelson and Winter corresponds to the idea of economic 
‘natural selection’ - market competition and the ‘struggle for existence’ in biology (Hodgson, 
1999). 
Therefore, Nelson and Winter adopt three essential analogies, constructing the link between their 
own concept of economic evolution and the struggle for life in biology (Hodgson, 1999). However, 
the authors strongly deny the existence of an exact correspondence. Routines are relatively robust in 
socio-economic terms. However, they are not as durable as the gene in biology and also, the new 
characteristics emerging from routines’ change can be imitated and inherited by imitators or 
subsidiary firms. Therefore, Nelson and Winter identify their theory as “unabashedly Lamarckian: it 
contemplates both the ‘inheritance’ of acquired characteristics and the timely appearance of 
variation under the stimulus of adversity” (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 11). That is, in their 
perspective socio-economic evolution has a nature characterized by the emphasis on the organism’s 
                                                           
14 Nelson and Winter use Simon’s idea of ‘satisficing’ (Simon, 1956): rather than optimising, agents try to achieve a 
given ‘aspiration level’. 
  12adaptation to the environment rather than on the environmental selection of the organism. For this 
reason, there is a place for intentionality and novelty in human behaviour and so Penrose’s 
objection to the use of the biological analogy in 1952 seems to be overcome (Hodgson, 1999). 
About their main prior intellectual references, Nelson and Winter have identified the influence of 
behavioural theorists as Simon and Alchian. In particular, they have acknowledged Schumpeter’s 
‘pervasive’ influence in their work (Nelson and Winter, 1982: 39).
15  
Andersen (1997) sees in these legacies a combination of distinct mechanisms: transmission, as in 
Simon’s work on behaviour; variety and creation, as in Schumpeter’s developments in invention 
and innovation; and selection, as in Alchian’s work on natural selection. Nelson and Winter (1982) 
use the computer to organize the necessary synthesis of these elements giving rise to a new 
modelling strategy that Andersen (1997: 7) summarizes as follows: “(1) Define the minimum 
environmental characteristics, including input and output conditions as well as the spaces in which 
search for new rules are performed. (2) Define the state of the industry at time t as a list of firm 
states, which include physical and informational characteristics as well as behavioural rules and 
meta-rules. (3) Calculate by means of (1) and (2) the activities of the industry in period t as well as 
the resultant state variables (including possible changes of rules) which characterise the system at 
the start of period t+1. (4) Make similar calculations for a series of periods and study the evolution 
of the application of different rules as well as other characteristics of the industry (economy)”. In 
Nelson and Winter (1982) this modelling scheme is used in the treatment of several problems 
within growth theory and industrial economics. 
During the 1980s and the 1990s, Nelson and Winter kept challenging the mainstream. One crucial 
point of their contributions has to do with the treatment of information and knowledge. In the 
neoclassical perspective, information and knowledge are considered as scarce resources, being 
obtained by individuals as any other commodity, at a certain price. Nelson and Winter have strongly 
reacted against this position, rejecting the ‘blueprint’ view of knowledge. Instead, they understand 
the acquisition of knowledge as a contextual and social process, deeply implanted in groups and 
institutions. This perspective is associated to Nelson and Winter’s rejection of the rationality 
                                                           
15 Hodgson (1999) considers as misleading the epithet ‘neo-Schumpeterian’ used by Nelson and Winter and others. 
Hodgson recalls the allergic feelings Schumpeter had to analogies with biology. In his opinion, the use of the term 
‘evolution’ by Schumpeter meant a general idea about economic development, without recognizing selection processes 
and inheritance of information or structure through learning or imitation. Graça Moura (1997) demonstrates that 
Schumpeter’s work is “consistently marked by a coexistence of two implicit ontologies: by a conflict between a closed 
system framework, which turns on equilibrium, and an open system approach, which encompasses creativity, 
indeterminacy and structural transformation” (Graça Moura, 1997: 153). In the presence of this dualistic position, it is 
understandable that some interpreters of Schumpeter’s work have emphasized his heterodox perspective while others 
have privileged his orthodox analysis. According to Graça Moura, both these options are not adequate. “Neither 
Schumpeter’s heterodox nor his orthodox proclivities can be regarded as mere ‘noise’, just as neither of them can be 
regarded as the ‘essence’ of his discourse” (Graça Moura, 1997: 154). 
  13neoclassical assumption. It means the discard of the concepts of optimisation and equilibrium and 
the adoption of an evolutionary frame where the understanding of learning and of the generation 
and transmission of knowledge has a fundamental role (Hodgson, 1999).
16 More recently, Nelson 
(1991) has further developed his evolutionary analysis of the firm and has contributed to the study 
of ‘National Systems of Innovation’ and to the modern theory of Economic Growth.  
Winter (1986) has continued to criticize what he considers as limitations of orthodox economics, 
namely through a strong critique of neoclassical perspective about rationality. “There is an 
important role for inquiry into the learning and adaptive processes of boundedly rational economic 
actors who are forced to act in a changing world they do not understand” (Winter, 1986: 174). 
In the ten years-period after the publication of Nelson and Winter’s book, published research in 
evolutionary economics continues to be focused essentially on appreciative theorizing around 
economic thought and methodological considerations. In fact, 46% of published articles concern 
‘HET and Methodology’ (Figure 1a), with 68% of total articles following an appreciative approach 
(Figure 1b). Although there is a reasonable proportion (29.2%) of papers within a formal method, it 
is apparent the scarcity of empirical studies – only 5.6% of total papers involve some type of 
empirical research, whereas no purely empirical paper exists.  
2.3 The 1990s onwards: the escalating of evolutionary research 
After the seminal influence of Nelson and Winter (1982) to the evolutionary reasoning, 
evolutionary economics continues to grow and the number of economists attracted to it seems to be 
increasing (Lawson, 2003).  
As Figure 2 illustrates, before 1990 the importance of published evolutionary related research is 
almost negligible. More than 90% of total papers were published after that date. In a yearly basis, 
between 2000 and 2004 it was published around 9-10% of total papers. Notwithstanding the 
resurgence of Evolutionary Economics occurred in the middle of the 1980s, namely after the 
publication of the seminal book of Nelson and Winter (1982), in terms of published articles the 
impact of that resurgence was only fully perceptive after 1990s. This trend might be, at in least in 
part, explained by the emergence of journals whose core target more specifically evolutionary 
research (e.g., Journal of Evolutionary Economics, which was created in 1991, and Games and 
Economic Behaviour, created in 1989). 
                                                           
16 Nelson (1980) criticizes the codifiable and cumulative nature that characterizes knowledge (including technological 
knowledge) in the orthodox analysis. He emphasizes that not all knowledge has a supported form of how-to-do-it and 
that sometimes it is not easy to expand directly knowledge by expenditure on research and development, for example 
when the main elements of techniques are closely associated with a particular personal skill. 








































































































































































































































































































































Figure  1a        Figure  1b 
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Figure 2: Evolution of published papers on evolutionary related research, 1969-2005 
Note: The number of articles is 2369, as it includes both papers with and without abstracts; the year of 2005 records papers only up to October. 
The empirical research on growth during the 1950s and 1960s, by the recognition of some particular 
features of technological advance, strongly contributed to the enhancement of evolutionary 
economics. Many studies demonstrated that important uncertainties are present in technological 
research, with agents perceiving risks in highly distinct degrees. Moreover, as a result of divergent 
opinions and insights among experts in a certain field, different entities or organizations promote 
distinct efforts at each moment, being in competition with each other and with the current 
technology. Also, it was shown that only after the commitment of important resources by the rivals, 
occurs the definition of the winners and the losers as the outcome of competition. “These features, 
together, naturally suggested evolutionary language and led to the development of explicit 
evolutionary theories of technological advance” (Nelson and Winter, 2002: 38). These empirical 
works were important to construct a general body of understanding around the idea that 
technological advance is an evolving phenomenon. Three main common features are highlighted 
(Nelson and Winter, 2002: 39): first, the recognition of the motion of technology and industry 
structure as a ‘co-evolution’; second, technology involves a body of artifacts, or practice, and a 
body of understanding such that, in general terms, artifacts, practice and understanding co-evolve; 
  16third, there has been increasing recognition of the range of institutions involved in technological 
advance. 
Evolutionary economists do not believe on the research program adopted within the mainstream. 
They consider that the recent developments in neoclassical models (for example the new 
endogenous growth models) corroborate the failure of the neoclassical rules of research since they 
are ‘mechanical’ in the same sense as are the old ones (e.g. Nelson, 1995; Northover, 1999). There 
are important evolutionary research centres, specially in Europe, for example, the DRUID, Danish 
Research Unit for Industrial Dynamics, in Denmark; the MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research 
Institute on Innovation and Technology, in the Netherlands; the SPRU, Science and Technology 
Policy Research, in England; and the LEM, Laboratory of Economics and Management, in Italy. 
Moreover, journals such as the Journal of Evolutionary Economics, the Research Policy, and the 
Industrial and Corporate Change, acknowledge evolutionary thinking. 
It is possible to identify many distinct types of research fields within evolutionary economics, even 
within the strictest area of evolutionary technological change and economic growth. Inspired by the 
work of Nelson and Winter (1982), several research families have been developed since then (Silva, 
2004). For example, the Innovation Systems Literature (e.g. Freeman 1988); the analysis of Sectoral 
Patterns of Technical Change (e.g. Pavitt, 1984; Dosi and Orsenigo, 1988); the Technological Gap 
literature (e.g. Fagerberg, 1988); Path-dependency and Lock-in Models (e.g. David, 1985; Arthur, 
1989); Evolutionary Growth Models (e.g. Silverberg, 1984). 
However, ‘Technical Change and Economic Growth’ area corresponds to only 6.6% of total 
published papers between 1992 and 2005 (see Figure 2). The most important areas are ‘HET and 
Methodology’ (28.5%) and ‘Games’ (18.7%).  
The theory of the firm also appears as one important subject of research within evolutionary 
economics – ‘Consumer and Organizations Behaviour’ encompasses 12.0% of published papers. 
After the seminal contribution of Nelson and Winter (1982), which offer important insights about 
the concept and nature of the firm, many contributions followed their lead (e.g., Kay, 1984; Dosi 
and Egidi, 1991; Winter, 1995). 
These approaches reject the idea of the firm as a ‘black-box’ that simply transforms inputs into 
outputs. Instead, they stress the importance of identifying the firm in terms of organizational 
coordination – the firm as a cognitive entity (Foss, 1997). This conceptualization conceives the 
production processes, while involving human beings, as highly dependent upon spread, uncodified 
and tacit knowledge. Since much of this knowledge is complex and inaccessible neither worker nor 
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Figure 2: Published papers by categories and methods, 1992-2005 
Legend: A - General Economics and Teaching; B - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods; D – Microeconomics; E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; F - 
International Economics; G - Financial Economics; H - Public Economics; I - Health, Education, and Welfare; J - Labor and Demographic Economics; K - Law and Economics; L - Industrial Organization; M - Business 
Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; N - Economic History; O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth; P - Economic Systems; Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource 
Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics; R - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics; Z - Other Special Topics. 
  18The analysis of the nature of knowledge and learning is crucial for a more comprehensive 
conceptualization of the firm. Neoclassical economics is not able to capture the perspective of 
learning as developmental and reconstructive process and not as a plain input of facts (Foss, 1997). 
In fact, for the mainstream, learning is interpreted as the cumulative process involving the 
acquisition of codifiable knowledge, where learning itself appears as informational absorption, is 
rather reductionistic (Cohendet and Steinmueller, 2000). Even when conceived as a Bayesian 
revision of subjective probability in the light of incoming data, it shows several problems, for 
example the fact that a process of Bayesian learning in search for an optimum depends on the 
existence of accurate former knowledge (Key, 1981; Dosi and Egidi, 1991). Although 
organizational knowledge interacts with individual knowledge (Winter, 1988; Dosi and Marengo, 
1994), it is more than the sum of individual parts. It is context-dependent, bounded by culture and 
institutionalized (Hodgson, 1999).  
In sum, evolutionary economists highlight Knight’s core idea that the existence of the firm in the 
real world is the result of the presence of uncertainty. 
Most imperative for the development and spread of evolutionary economics seems to be the digital 
computer, although the influence of the computer in developments within economics is very young. 
Mirowski (2002) highlights the rise of the ‘cyborg’ sciences, which occurred mainly in the USA 
during the World War II, and its profound effects for the content and organization of natural and 
social sciences. He stresses the pressure exerted by the current scientific diaspora - caused by the 
impact that the end of the Cold War and the associated changes in the funding of scientific research 
had on physics, with “the … contraction of physics and the continuing expansion of molecular 
biology” (Mirowski, 2002: 10) -, for the beginning of the transformation of economic concepts. As 
a result of such interdisciplinary research, a different method of economics has emerged, based on a 
combination between computational languages and institutional themes. According to Mirowski 
(2002: 11), the reluctance of economists to abandon the classical mechanics paradigm in favour of a 
new paradigm based in computer science and in cognitive sciences in general results in “numerous 
tensions in fin-de-siècle orthodox economics”. 
The reinforcement of evolutionary economics seems unquestionably associated to the development 
of computational methods, which has increasingly allowed dealing with the complexity associated 
to its open-system approach. 
In the next section some considerations are made concerning what appears to be an excessive 
emphasis on modelling and formalization issue on the behalf of evolutionary researchers. As 
documented below, empirical related research has been relatively neglected.  
  194. The need for redirecting the evolutionary research agenda: from modelling ‘obsession’ 
towards empirical work  
Within mainstream economics it is usually advocated that an argument is well treated only when it 
is formally articulated. Nelson (1998: 498) asks what the gains are obtained by the “formalization 
of existing unformalized understandings”. Formalization is often a controversial issue for debate 
between orthodox and heterodox researchers. 
Although many still argue against the problems of formalism, it seems clear the importance of the 
formalization in the emergence and consolidation of some economic research streams, for example 
modern economic growth, as the subsequent work to the Solow model shows. Even being aware 
that the work of Solow in the 1950s did not fill an ‘intellectual vacuum’, it remains unquestionable 
its main role in the origins of growth theory (Blaug 2000) and this relevance, as Nelson himself 
recognizes, is associated to the fact that Solow's analysis “was structured by a ‘formal’ theory, 
whereas the theorizing in these earlier pieces was more ‘appreciative and looser’” (Nelson, 1998: 
504). The formalization of already existent ideas by the new neoclassical growth models was 
crucial to the renewed interest in economic growth observed since the mid 1980s. 
Romer (1993) emphasizes the need for formalism in heterodox theories such as the evolutionary 
approach. He considers that a consensus on the importance of concepts such as the idea gap will be 
attained only taking into account both the abstract theorising developed by the mainstream 
(neoclassical tradition) and the effort of other approaches focused on a large range of qualitative 
evidence. The author predicts that the continuous rejection of formalism may compromise the 
impact of those theories and, eventually, conduct to their slow banishment, in spite of their strong 
advantage, the support of real world. 
The crowding out of some evolutionary insights may be used to sustain such pessimist predictions 
about the future of evolutionary economics. Giving as an example the mainstream neo-
Schumpeterian models, developed as simple, abstract models, relying on optimisation and foresight, 
and their efforts to codify some important evolutionary, Romer (1993: 556) argues that the 
mainstream is clearly developing efforts in the treatment of ideas: “Appreciative theorists and 
evolutionary economics may find that a simple formal model can highlight crucial issues that have 
been obscured in more complicated settings”. 
Nevertheless, evolutionists do not accept concepts like optimisation and equilibrium. As Nelson 
(1995: 50) puts it “[i]t has been argued that the process of evolution is strongly path dependent and 
there is no unique selection equilibrium”. Evolutionary economists understand the emergence of 
new neoclassical growth models as a corroboration of the failure of the neoclassical rules of 
  20research, and consider that those models are ‘mechanical’ in the same sense as the old ones. The 
conceptual tools that are used in those ‘new’ approaches, for example optimal rationality, 
production functions and equilibrium systems based on Newtonian mechanical analogies, remain 
essentially static, and offer fragile explanations for understanding intrinsically ever changing 
processes such as technological change (Northover 1999). 
Moreover, Nelson (1995) argues that since the publication of the book An Evolutionary Theory of 
Economic Change the use of evolutionary concepts has been increasingly associated to formal 
theorizing. Figure 3 offers evidence supporting such statement, that is, the growing of formal 
contributions, namely associated with ‘Games’, within this research area. 
The developments observed in nonlinear dynamic systems have been an important stimulus to 
theorizing in evolutionary economics (Nelson, 1995). Such developments are used for example in 
evolutionary game theory, which represented, respectively 9.7%, 17.2% and 21.9% of total papers 
published in 1982-1991, 1992-2002, and 2003-2005. However, this particular evolutionary research 
field should be “regarded as a field on its own right, with its own questions, and methods” (Nelson 
1995: 51). In fact, its general analytical procedure is the specification of an evolutionary process, 
operative on a certain set of employed strategies, and the exploration whether or not the existing 
strategies converge to a steady state and, if they do, the analysis of equilibrium’s characteristics. 
This line of reasoning is not coherent with the typical evolutionary concept of path dependency 
since it keeps defining equilibrium in terms of a given set of strategies. 
Behind the increasing importance of formalism in evolutionary research stands the development of 
a considerable amount of work on complex dynamic systems through computed simulation. The 
evolution of computers and programming languages and techniques is a crucial factor of motivation 
to the development of formal evolutionary theorizing in economics (Nelson, 1995). Andersen 
(1997) stresses the impetus given by programming languages and computer models as means of 
scientific communication to evolutionary economic studies. The author identifies the possibility of a 
comparable development in the study of economic evolution in close relation to Artificial Life, 
“Artificial Economic Evolution” (Andersen, 1997: 4), giving as an example the work of Lane 
(1993a, 1993b). In this line of research, genetic algorithms and classifier systems are used as 
mechanisms for formalizing artificial agents’ learning procedures. Although many social scientists 
argue against these procedures considering that they appeal to a “discrete genetic mechanism of 
inheritance à la biological DNA”, their supporters consider that they can be used “agnostically 
simply as algorithm tools to allow learning to happen, if not as models of how learning actually 






























































Figure 3: Published papers (number) by theme and method, 1982-2005 
Legend: 1 – Formal; 2 – Appreciative; 3 - Formal+Empirical; 4 - Appreciative+Empirical; 5 – Empirical; 6 - Surveys 
  22Learning procedures can be modelled as a change in the probability distribution of possible actions 
that the firm might take at any time, emerging as the outcome of a feedback from what has been 
developed and its consequences (Nelson, 1995). The learning equations are very similar to the ones 
used to describe the evolution in populations as in the population ecology theories (see, for 
example, Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1984; Holland et al., 1986).  
Andersen (1997) argues that the viability of evolutionary economics lies on the consideration of 
four characteristics: (i) a population perspective; (ii) a combination of an algorithm and a complete 
formal approach; (iii) an empirical orientation, and (iv) an interaction with older, verbal studies of 
economic evolution. The use of a population perspective suggests a ‘box of tools’ for evolutionary 
economics (Andersen, 1997: 2). Although Alchian (1950) was the first author who explicitly 
proposed the population perspective, Nelson and Winter (1982) were pioneers in exploring the tool-
box suggested by that approach. As the mechanism underlying economic evolution is rather 
complex, evolutionary economic studies have a synthetic nature. As this synthesis should be the 
outcome of distinct sub-mechanisms, the basic task remains in showing how an evolutionary 
process can be synthesized from the individual ones (Andersen, 1997). The major difficulty here 
arises from the fact that the mechanisms are usually associated to different sciences. For example, 
the preservation and transmission of rules and norms are frequently seen as a sociological object but 
are also analysed by institutional economics; the phenomena of variety and creation is studied by 
psychology but also, as innovation analysis, by economics; selection is especially analysed by 
standard economics; mechanisms of segregation and closing are studied by industrial economics but 
also by sociology.  Efforts to integrate all these mechanisms in the study of evolutionary processes 
are necessarily ambitious and risky. However, “it is the synthesis between different theories rather 
than the contributions to the detailed understanding of the individual mechanisms which is the core 
factor of evolutionary economics” (Andersen, 1997: 3).  
Therefore, Andersen proposes as an evolutionary explanation in economics one that explains a fact 
of economic life having as reference previous facts and a causal link which demonstrably includes a 
mechanism of preservation and transmission, a mechanism of variety and creation, a mechanism of 
selection, and which includes or may be improved by the introduction of a mechanism of 
segregation among distinct populations. “The emergence of an evolutionary process presupposes 
that none of the individual mechanisms becomes too dominant. If preservation dominates, the result 
is a stasis of economic knowledge, while a dominance of a variety-creation leads to non-
deterministic chaos” (Andersen, 1997: 3). The computer revolution creates the conditions to give a 
full account for the evolution of a population of firms and technologies. 
  23Although recognizing from experience that progress into more formalization may tend to reduce the 
segments to alternative thinking, Andersen considers that the “transformation to a paradigm-based 
new evolutionary economics may be eased by tools which mediate between, on the one hand, the 
informal and empirical approaches and on the other hand the fully mathematicised analysis of 
evolutionary processes” (Andersen, 1997: 21).  
Considering that many of the developed studies are representative of this kind of mediation rather 
than of complete formal approaches, and reflecting about the mathematical modelling of biological 
evolution in the 1930s, Andersen sustains that the recent evolutionary modelling in economics will 
be developed into a part of an overall synthesis between descriptive contributions and theoretical 
studies of economic life and its adaptiveness and diversity. The feasibility of evolutionary 
economics is strongly connected with its empirical nature as a science. The modelling efforts must 
be made in interaction with well-defined areas of empirical analysis (Andersen, 1997).  
However, our results show that in this domain few works exists combining conceptual and 























Figure 4: Distribution of published papers (%) by method, 1982-2005 
 
In the next section we offer a systematisation of evolutionary research paths during the global 
period, from 1969 up to 2005. After that, we present some evidence regarding the ‘quality’ of 
research within the evolutionary field.  
  245. Further account of evolutionary research 
5.1. Results for the global period (1969-2005) 
The global results evidence two rather extreme main research themes (Figure 5): ‘History of 
Economic Thought (HET) and Methodology’ and ‘Games’. Regarding the first stream of research, 
contributions tend to focus on ‘Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology’ (37.4%) and 
Microeconomics (16.9%). ‘Economic Development, Technological Change and Growth’ emerges 
as the third most frequent category, encompassing 13.5% of the total. Concerning ‘Games’ theme 
the bulk (82.9%) of the published papers address ‘Mathematical and Quantitative Methods’ (46.5%) 
and ‘Microeconomics’ (36.4%). Within this later category, ‘Search, Learning, Information and 























Figure 5: Journal articles in the evolutionary economics by main theme (% total) 
Source: Authors’ own computations based on journals’ articles collected from the Econlit database, 1969-2005. 
‘Technical Change, Growth and Business Cycle’ is a poorly explored issue with just 127 out of 
1936 papers. Within these the vast majority deals with ‘Economic Development, Technological 
Change and Growth’ (50.8%), where ‘One, Two and Multisector Growth Models’ is the prominent 
sub-category (39%). ‘Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics’ also has some relevance 
representing around one quarter of the category’s total, with ‘General Aggregative Models’ 
(Marxian, Sraffian, Institutional, Evolutionary) absorbing almost half of it. 
  25The distribution of papers by method reflects in large extent the corresponding main themes (cf. 
Figure 6). In fact, the most important method is the appreciative with approximately half of the 
articles, which is the principal method of ‘HET and Methodology’. Similarly, formal approaches 
represent 32.1% of the papers a substantial part of which are ‘Games’. In global, as noted before, 
empirical works are relatively scarce within evolutionary related research. Indeed, only 17.1% of 















Figure 6: Journal articles in the evolutionary economics by main method (% total) 
Source: Authors’ own computations based on journals’ articles collected from the Econlit database, 1969-2005. 
Focusing on the subjects which involve a larger number of papers (HET and Methodology, and 
Games), their positioning in terms of methods is almost reverse – 95.4% of ‘HET and 
Methodology’ articles use appreciative methods, whereas 91.3% of ‘Games’ papers are formal.  
Empirical methods are more frequently used by works concerning ‘Technological and Industrial 
Dynamics’ (49.4% of total papers in this theme) and ‘Regional’ (43%). 
Within ‘Technical change, Growth and Business Cycle’ theme, the most common method is formal 
(63%) and not, as expected, empirical. This later method is only used in 22% of that theme’s 
papers. In the remaining themes, the appreciative method appears as the most widely used. 
 
  26Table 2: Distribution (%) of main themes and methodology (n=1936) 
















55,1  17,3  7,9 4,7 9,4 5,5 6,6 




15,0  52,6  1,5 19,7 9,1  2,2 14,2 
Games  91,3  3,1 2,0 0,0 0,0 3,6  18,4 
HET and 
Methodology  1,8  95,4  0,2 0,5 0,0 2,1  29,0 
Regional  23,1  30,8  4,6  21,5  16,9 3,1  3,4 
Total  32,1  48,3  2,4 7,7 7,0 2,4  100,0 
Source: Authors’ own computations based on journals’ articles collected from the Econlit database, 1969-2005. 
The following figures show quite clearly that whichever the sub-categories in the ‘HET and 
Methodology’ and ‘Games’ categories there is a noticeable pattern towards one unique method – 
appreciative in the first case and formal in the second. In contrast, in ‘Technical change, Growth 
and Business Cycle’ theme, the pattern is more diffuse. In concrete, for the most important 
categories – ‘Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics’ (25%) and ‘Economic Development, 
Technological Change and ‘Growth’ (51%) – all types of methods are use with formal rising as the 
most frequent approach. 
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Figure 7: Distribution of HET and Methodology, Games and Technical Change, Growth and Business Cycles by 
categories and methods 
Legend: A - General Economics and Teaching; B - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology; C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods; D – Microeconomics; E 
- Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; F - International Economics; G - Financial Economics; H - Public Economics; I - Health, Education, and Welfare; J 
- Labor and Demographic Economics; K - Law and Economics; L - Industrial Organization; M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; 
Accounting; N - Economic History; O - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth; P - Economic Systems; Q - Agricultural and Natural 
Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics; R - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics; Z - Other Special Topics. 
5.2 On the ‘quality’ of evolutionary research  
Scientific papers are fundamental vehicles for knowledge diffusion all over the world. However, 
these papers have different ‘quality’, being natural that only papers with high ‘quality’ sustain other 
future works (Laband and Piette, 1994).
17
Based on March 2006 RePEc’s journals list by impact factor
18 and (partially) applying the 
classification system of the Tinbergen Institute
19 we computed a ranking of the academic journals 
                                                           
17 For an excellent approach to the issue of top ranking journals impact see Vieira (2004). 
18 This list provides a simple impact factor, computing a ratio of citations by the number of articles in the journals. 
These computations are experimental and based on the citation analysis provided by the CitEc project, which uses data 
from items listed in RePEc. Citation counts are adjusted to exclude citations from the same journals. These 
computations are experimental and based on the citation analysis provided by the CitEc project, which uses data from 
items listed in RePEc. Citation counts are adjusted to exclude citations from the same journals 
(http://ideas.repec.org/top/top.journals.simple.html).  
19 http://www.tinbergen.nl/research/ranking2.html, accessed on March 2006.  
  28indexed in Econlit. The Tinbergen Institute has drawn up a classification of journals in the field of 
economics. In this ranking journals have been classified as: AA: generally accepted top-level 
journals; A: very good journals covering economics in general and the top journals in each field; B: 
good journals for all research fields. Such classification is based roughly in the following cut offs 
(according to the impact factor), AA: > 3; A: > 1.5; B > 0.3. We added three other categories, C: 
>0.1,  D: impact factor lower than 0.1, and NC: journals that are not ranked (in RePEc, the 
Tinbergen Institute ranking, or Kalaitzidakis et al., 2003). 
In Figure 8 we represent the number of papers published by academic journal, identified by ranking. 
As it is easily to confirm, only a small portion of evolutionary papers were published in top- 
journals. The picture highlights the importance of the class B journal - Journal of Evolutionary 
Economics – in terms of publication of evolutionary research. Over the entire period, from 1969 up 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Evolutionary papers by Top-30 Journals  
Source: Authors’ own computations based on journals’ articles collected from the Econlit database, 1969-2005 (n=1936). 
Note: Top-30 Journals encompass 52.4% of total papers. 
Considering the published articles by main theme, Figure 9 shows that only the category ‘Games’ 

































Figure 9: Evolutionary papers by main theme: distribution (%) by journals’ ranking 
Source: Authors’ own computations based on journals’ articles collected from the Econlit database, 1969-2005 (n=1936). 
 
In terms of the methodology adopted by the articles, it is obvious the importance of formal 
approaches in the top-journals published papers. Once more, this is associated with the framework 
implemented in papers concerning the theme ‘Games’. Figures 11 and 12 confirm this. 
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Figure 10: Evolutionary papers by journals’ ranking: distribution (%) by main theme  
















Figure 11: Evolutionary papers by method: distribution (%) by journals’ ranking 
Source: Authors’ own computations based on journals’ articles collected from the Econlit database, 1969-2005. 
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Figure 12: Evolutionary papers by journals’ ranking: distribution (%) by method  
Source: Authors’ own computations based on journals’ articles collected from the Econlit database, 1969-2005. 
 
From the above evidence, it is possible to conclude that the articles published in top-academic 
journals, in a considerable proportion, are constructed within a formal frame. In fact, around 70% of 
  31the total papers published in AA journals are formal. In A papers this percentage goes up to almost 
90%.  
The relative amount of empirical published papers is very low; whatever the considered journal’s 
ranking. Once more, this reveals the important lacuna within evolutionary economics: empirical 
research is incipient.  
6. Conclusion 
In the context of an overview on evolutionary economics, the purpose of this paper was to explore 
the main research path and contributions of this theorizing framework using bibliometric methods.  
From all the evidence we have collected for the period 1969-2005, a crucial concern emerged: the 
scarcity of empirical research within evolutionary economics. This evidence is particularly striking 
since the ontological foundations of evolutionary thought represent a compromise with real-world 
economy. Therefore, we think that this quantified evidence may help reorienting the debate 
concerning the evolutionary research agenda.  
The problem within evolutionary research is not just associated to the formalization of concepts. 
Our study shows that more than 30% of the total published papers adopt a formal approach. Of 
course, most studies involved in that fraction correspond to ‘Games’, which are a particular field 
within evolutionary economics. In fact, 91.3% of total published papers within the ‘Games’ 
category, during 1969-2005, is formal. Nevertheless, in other main themes, formal approaches are 
significantly present, for example 55.1% in ‘Technological Change, Growth and Business Cycles’ 
and almost 40% in ‘Consumers and Organizations Behaviour’, for the global period. Nevertheless, 
with the exception of ‘Games’, there is a significant dispersion in terms of the adopted formal 
frames within evolutionary research. This has to do with the intrinsic, wide dispersion associated 
with the ontological foundations of the discipline, not allowing a common, formal framework such 
as the axiomatic, equilibrium, closed system approach adopted in neoclassical research. 
In spite of the importance of the debate concerning the formalization of evolutionary concepts, our 
documentation effort showed the need to re-focus the debate, by questioning the scarcity of 
empirical evolutionary research. An economic research field that requires the proximity with real-
world agents cannot be sufficiently validated unless it goes into the empirical work. Even the 
relevance of evolutionary research in terms of political economy demands such an effort. 
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